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The transfer of technology from the West to the East has been an 
issue of serious debate since the introduction of detente in the 1970s. 
Recent disclosures by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicate 
that the Soviet and East European intelligence services have,been so 
successful in acquiring U.S. technology that there now exists a signifi- 
cant threat to the national security of the United States. The CIA 
speculates that the Soviets and East Europeans will increase their 
efforts for legal and illegal acquisition of U.S. technology in several 
areas : 
o Computers -- systems designs, concepts, hardware and software 
o Microelectronics -- complete industrial processes and equipment 
for Soviet military requirementa 
o Lasers -- optical, pulsed power and other laser-related components 
for laser weapons 
o Radars -- air defense radars for missile systems 
The Reagan Administration has proposed a package of countermeasures 
to curtail the flow of military-related technology. This includes: 
strengthening U.S. export controls, increasing efforts against foreign 
industrial espionage, expanding the list of "military critical tech- 
nologies" which should not be exported, and influencing the academic 
community to reduce Soviet access to U.S. research through the free 
exchange of information. 
This Info Pack provides unclassified, background information and 
analysis of the politico-military impact of technology transfers on the 
United States and the NATO allies. It contains proposals by the Reagan 
Administration to redress the problems posed to the national security 
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Soviet Acquisition of 
Western Technology 
Introduction 
The United States and its Allies traditionally have 
relied on the technological superiority of their weag 
ons to preserve a credible counterforce to the quanti- 
tative superiority of the Wanaw Pact. But that 
technical superiority is eroding as the Soviet Union 
and its Allies introduce more and more sophisticated 
weaponry-weapons that all too often are manufac- 
tured with the direct help of Western technology.' 
Stopping the Soviets' extensive aquisition of mili- 
tary-related Western technology-in ways that,are 
both effective and appropriate in our open society-is 
one of the most complex and urgent issues facing the 
Free World today. 
This report describes the Soviet program to aquire  
US and Western technology, the aquisition mecha- 
nisms used, the spectrum of Wcstern aquisitions that 
have contributed to Soviet military might, the project- 
ed Soviet priority needs for Western technology, and 
the problems of effectively stemming the transfer of 
Western technology that could someday find applica- 
tion in weapons used to threaten the West. 
Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology: 
A National-Level Program 
Since at least the 1 9 3 0 ~ ~  the Soviet Union has devoted 
vast amounts of its financial and manpower resources 
to the aquisition of Western technology that would 
enhance its military power and improve the efficiency 
of its military manufacturing technology. Today this 
Soviet effort is massive, well planned, and well man- 
aged-a national-level program approved at the high- 
est party and governmental levels. 
' While there are numerous intcrpreklions of "technology" lor 
weapons. it is defintd in this rcport as the application olrcientDc 
knowledge, technical information. know-how, critical rnateriars, 
keystone manufacturing and 1 s t  equipment, and end produrn . 
which'are arcntial to the restarch and development as well as the 
wries manufaaurc of modem highqualily weapons and military 
cquipmcnl. Western technology is defined as that t&nobgy 
'dmlopcd by the Free World. 
This program accords top priority to the military and 
military-related industry, and major attention is also 
given to the civilian sectors of Soviet industry that 
support military production. 
The Soviets and their Wanaw P a a  allies have o b  
tained vast amounts of militarily significant Western . 
technology and quipment through legaI and illegal 
means. They have succeeded in aquiring the most 
advanced Western technology by using, in part, their 
scientific and technological agreements with the West 
to facilitate access to the new technologies that are 
emerging from the Free World's applied scientific 
research efforts; by spending their scarce hard curren- 
cy to illegally purchase controlled equipment, as well 
as to legally purchase uncontrolled advanctd Western 
technologies having military-industrial applications; 
and by tasking their intelligence services to aquire  
illegally those US and Western technologies that are 
classified and export controlled. 
The Soviets have b u n  very successful in aquiring 
Western technology by blending acquisitions legally 
and illegally acquired by different government organi- 
zations. The Soviet intelligence services-the Soviet 
Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Chief 
Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Gcncral Staff 
(GRU)-have the primary responsibility for collecting 
Western classified, export-controlled, and proprietary 
technology, using both clandtstine and oven collec- 
tion methods. They in turn make extensive use of 
many of the East European Intelligence Services (see 
inset, p. 2); for their efforts in aquiring Western 
technology, these countries are paid in part with 
Soviet military quipment and weapons. 
Clandestine acquisition of the West's most advanctd 
military-related quiprnent and know-how by the 
KGB and GRU is a major and growing problem. 
East European Intelligence Services Arquire 
Technologies for rhe Soviet Union 
In the late 1970s aformer East European intelligence 
oflcer revealed organizational and iargeting details 
related to Soviet-directed arquisirions 4/  Western 
technology by East European intelligence sentices, 
parricularly military-indunrial many/acturing- 
related ~echnologies ihar were given the highest prior- 
ity for collection by ar least one East European 
intelligence service. Many technologies were acquired 
rhrough dummy firms established in Western Europe 
that were succesdul in securing some d r h e  most 
advanced iechnologies in the West, including com- 
puter, microelectronic, nuclear, and chemical 
rechnologies. 
In microelectronics, for example, many LISfirms 
were targeted through their ut7iliates in Western 
Europe; scientists, technicians, and commercial rep  
resentorives also were succesdully recruited ro pro- 
vide irJotmation during their trips to Europe. Al- 
though most d r h e  milirary and defense-industrial 
idormation acquired by East European ituelligence 
services wen1 to the Soviets, much d i l  was used by 
r he East Europeans themselves to bc&t their mili- 
tary and civilian indunries. The computer, micre 
electronic, and photographic areas were priority tar- 
gets. The East European countries bendfiled con- 
siderably from microelectronic acquisitions, and 
could nor have achieved the present level of develop 
men1 in their computer indusrry withour illegal 
acquisitions of West ern technology. 
These intelligence organizations have b u n  so success- 
ful at acquiring Western technology that the man- 
power levels they allocate to this effort have increased 
significantly since the 1970s to the point where there 
are now several.thousand technology c~llection offi- 
cers at work. These personnel, under various covers 
ranging from diplomats to journalists to trade offi- 
cials, are assigned throughout the world. 
Soviet foreign tjade organizations, or enterprises, 
although quasi-independent entities, are partially sub- 
ordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and their 
activities are closely coordinated by this Ministry. 
They have major responsibilities for both legal and 
illegal acquisitions and purchases; they work closely 
with the KGB and GRU in arranging trade aiver- 
sions. East European trade companies assist them in 
clandestine and illegal acquisition operations. 
Official Sovid and East European science and ttch- 
nology (S&T) organizations also play a major role in 
both open and clandestine acquisition of Western 
technology. Tbe Soviet State Committee for Scicna 
and Tahnology (GKNI) is the key player in amng- 
ing government-to-government sc i tna  and *echnol- 
ogy apttcments to facilitate a-s to and the acquisi- 
tion of established as well as new technologies, 
including those just emerging from W s t m  univeni- 
ties, laboratories, and high-technology firms. It is the 
G m  that oversets tbe aUocation of scarce Soviet 
hard currency for the legal purchase by various Soviet 
organizations of selected Western ~ o l o g y  for !b 
viet military panposts. If the GKNT is unable to 
acquirr tbe -ry kchnolopy by open or legal 
means, it tasks Soviet intelligence to clandestinely 
aquire  the technology. 
It is the well-organized and w&coordinated use of all 
these organizations that has made the Soviet program 
to acquire Western technology so succssful. As a 
result, the Soviets have acquired militarily significant , 
technologies and m'ticaIly important industrial West- 
ern technologies that have benefited every major 
Soviet industry engaged in the research, dcveiopment, 
and production of weapon systems. 
Soviet MechPnisms for Acquiring Western Technology 
Soviet aquisition mechanisms include: legal means 
through open literature, through legal trade channtis, 
and .through student scientific and ttthnoiogical ex- 
changes and conferences; illegal means through trade 
channels that evade US and Western (is. CoCom)' 
export controls, including aquisitions by their intelli- 
gence services through recruited a p t s  and industrial 
' ~ho-~oordinati'ng Committee ( C o h )  was established in 1949 to 
serve as the forum for Watcrn efforts to dmlop a system of 
strategic txpon amtrois. It is  compostd af the Unitcd S u ~ a ,  the 
United Kingdom, Turkey, Portugal, Norway. the Nclherhndr, 
Luxcmbou~g. Japan. luly. G=, France, the Federal Republic of 
Gcnruny, Denmark Canada. and Belgium. 
espionage. While a large volume of technology is 
acquired by nonintelligence personnel, the overwhelm- 
ing majority of what the United States considers to be 
militarily significant technology acquired by and for 
the Soviets was obtained by the Soviet intelligence 
services and their surrogates among the East Europe- 
an intelligence services. However, legal aquisitions 
by other Soviet organizations are important since it is 
often the combination of legally and illegally aquired 
technologies that gives the Soviets the complete mili- 
tary or industrial capability they need. 
Because of the priority accorded to the military over 
the civilian sectors of the Soviet economy, Western 
dual-use technology-ix., technology with both mili- 
tary and civilian applications-almost always finds its 
way first into military industries, and subsequently 
into the civilian sectors of industries that support 
military production. Thus, Soviet assurances that 
legally purchased dual-use technology will k used 
solely for civilian applications can seldom be accepted 
at face value. 
Legal aquisitions generally have their greatest im- 
pact on the Soviets' broad industrial base, and thus 
affect military technology on a relatively long-term 
basis. The Soviet Kama Truck Plant, for example, 
was built over some seven yeais with massive imports 
of more than f 1.5 billion worth of US and West 
European automotive production quipment and tech- 
nology. Large numbers of military-specification 
trucks produced there in 198 1 are now being used by 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan and by Soviet military 
units in Eastern.Europc opposite NATO forces. Simi- 
larly, large Soviet purchases of printed circuit board 
technology and numerically controlled machine tools 
from the West already have benefited military manu- 
facturing sectors. 
The Soviets give priority to those purchases that meet 
the direct needs of the Soviet military-industrial 
complex by paying for them in hard c~rrency.~Over 
the past 10 years, the Soviets legally and illegally 
purchased large quantities of Western high-technol- 
ogy microelectronics quipment that has enabled 
thtrri to build their own military microeltctronics 
industry in a short time. This acquired capability in 
microelectronics is the critical basis for the present 
wide-ranging enhancements of Soviet military sys- 
tems and for their continuing sop;histication. 
Acquisitions through illegal trade channels often have 
both industrial and military applications, and tbus are 
important in the near term. Illegal aquisitions of 
technology fall into two general categories, botb of 
which are extremely difficult to detect and monitor. 
One is the diversion of controlled technology from 
legitimate trade channels to proscribed destinations. 
This is done through US and foreign firms that are 
willing to engage in profitable impropriety; through 
agents-in-place in US or foreign firms or foreign 
subsidiaries of US firms; through Soviet- and East 
Europcan-owned firms locally chartered in tbe 
West; and through foreign purchasing agents (includ- 
ing arms dealers). For instance, to evade the US 
embargo on microelectronic technology exports to the 
Soviet Union, the Soviets and their surrogates have 
set up dummy corporations in the West that purchase 
sophisticated microclcctronics manufacturing cqdp 
ment. This quipment is then shipped and reshipped, 
sometimes with the knowledge of individuals in the 
companies, to disguise its ultimate destination-tbe 
Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Botb the Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact intelligence services are in the main- 
stream of this illegal technology trade flow. The other 
type of diversion is an in-place diversion, in which 
legally acquired technology and equipment-in the 
computer area, for example--are put to military end 
uses not authorized in export license applications, 
The aquisitions that most directly a f f m  Soviet 
military development have come from intelligence 
collection and related illegal trade diversions. Soviet 
Bloc inte!ligence services have concentrated their 
effort in the United States, Western Europe, and 
Japan. These scrvices target defense contractors and 
high-technology firms working on advanced technol- 
ogy (both classified and unclassified), foreign firms 
and subsidiaries of US firms abroad, and internation- 
al organizations with access to advanced and/or 
proprietary technology, including access to computer 
data base networks throughout the world. 
Table 1 
Major Fields of Technology of Interest to 
Soviet and East European Visitors to the United States 
Computers Architecture Memories 
Automatic Control N/C (Numcricaliy Controlled) Units 
CAD (Computer-Aidcd Design) Networks 
Cybernetia/Artificial lntcll~gencc Pattern Recognition 
Data Basts Programming 
Image Processing Design Robots 
Image Processing/Retrieval Software 
Materas Amorphous Metallurgy 
CAD N / C  Machine Tools 
Composites Powder Metals 
Cryogenics Superconducton 
Deformation TatinglNDT won-Destructive) 
Stmiconductors CAD Design 
Circuits Ion lmplanution 
Defects . . Production Technology 
Devim SAW (Surface Acoustic Wave) Devim 
Communiatiom, Navigatiw, Antennas Salcllitc Co~rnun~at icns  
and Gmtroi Microwav+/Millimeter Waves Signal Proce+rinp 
Radio Wave Propagation f elccommunicaticrrs 
Vcbicular/Transportatmn Marine System Shipbuilding 
Lrvr and Optics Fikr Optics Optics 
Gas h e n  Tunable Lawn 
-* 
N u d a r  Pbysics Cryogenics Rcanws 
Fusion Structural Designs 
Materials Superconductan 
MHD (Magnetohydrodynamics) 
Microbioh Gencuc Enginur~ng 
Both legal and illegal acquisitions of US and Western 
technology and quipment are coordinated with infor- 
mation obtained through the complex network of 
international governmental scientific and technical 
agreements and exchanges that the USSR maintains 
with the advanced industrial nations. These include 
know-how, equipment, and computer data base collec- 
tion activities of Soviet scientists and engineers who 
participate in academic, commercial, and official 
S&T exchanges. Visiting Soviet and East European 
technical and student delegations to the United States 
generally consist of expert scientists, many of whom 
are connected with classified work in their home 
countries. Such was the case with the Soviet scientist 
who managed-to get assigned to fuel-air explosives 
work. When he finished his US study programs, he 
almost ccr&nly returned to the USSR to work on 
related weapons. Other Soviet and East European 
scientists have come to the United States to work in 
the aerohydrodynarnic, cryogenic, optic, laser, corn- 
puttr, magnetic bubble computer memory, nuclear, 
microelectronic, and structural and electronic rnateri- 
a1 areas. Given the military importancc of these fields 
to the Soviet Unian, it appears likely that a high 
percentage of these scientists will work on military- 
related programs in these areas after they return 
home. 
From the beginning, Soviet candidates in various 
academic and scientific exchange programs have 
nearly always proposed research activities involving 
techpblogies in areas that have direct military appli- 
cations and ill which the Soviets are technologicaliy 
deficient. Table 1 provides a list of the key high- 
technology fields that Soviet and East European 
visitors come to the United States to study, research, 
or discuss, many of which are on the US Militarily 
Critical Technology Lisl today. In cach of the past 
two years, more than a third of the 50 program 
proposals offered under the Graduate Student/Young 
Faculty Program of the International Research and 
Exchanges Board (IREX) has been completely un- 
acceptable in terms of prospective technology loss, 
and many other programs needed to be modified or 
have access constrained before the exchanges could be 
allowcd. 
Thc Soviets correctly view the United States and 
several other Western countries as a continuing 
source of important and openly available scientific 
and technical information, which they take every 
opportunity to obtain access to. Some of the unclassi- 
fied documents so acquired are previously classified 
materials which had been downgraded to unclassified 
through US procedures providing for automatic de- . 
classification after a stipulated period. When w l l a -  
ed on a massive scale and centrally processed by the 
Soviets, this information becomes significant because 
it is collectively used by Soviet weapons designers and 
weapons countermcasure experts. 
The Soviets also regularly attend high-technology 
trade shows, and attempt to visit commercial firms in 
the West, particularly small and medium-sized firms 
that are active in developing new technologies. These 
apparent trade promotion efforts often mask Soviet 
attempts to acquire emerging Western technological 
know-how before its military uses have been identified 
and government security controls have been applied. 
Emerging technologits are particukrly vulnerable to 
foreign collection efforts of this type. 
Soviet intelligence continues to place a high priority 
on the collection of S&T information on genetic 
engineering and futuristic weapons such as lasers and 
particle beam weapons. The Soviets have been s tep  
ping up their efforts to acquire new and emerging, 
technologies such as very-high-speed integrated-c6- 
cuit (VHSIC) and very-large-scale integration (VLST) 
technology from Western universities and commercial 
laboraiories for both military and commercial 
applications. 
Over the past few years there has been an increased 
use of Soviet- and East European.+wned firms locally 
chartered in the United States and abroad to exploit 
Western-controlled and military-related technology. 
There are more than twenty Soviet- and East 
European+wned firms in the United States, and near, 
the end of the 1970s there were more than 300 similar' 
firms in Western Europe. In addition to the United 
States, heavy concentrations are in the United King- 
dom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, the Federal - 
Republic of Germany, France, Canada, Belgium, and 
Austria. These firms are avenues for Soviet aquisi- 
tion of advanced Western technologies, as was shown 
when the US engineer arrested in late 1981 was 
charged with selling US secret documents to an East 
European intelligence officer employed by a Polish- 
owned firm chartered in Illinois (see inset, p. 6). 
Furthermore, firms chartered in the United States 
can legally purchase controlled US technology and 
study it without actually violating US export controls 
unkss they attempt to export the equipment or related 
technical data from the United States without a 
license. 
Soviet Acquisitions and Benefits 
Today's recognition of the crucial role of Wtstern 
technology in the development and production of 
Soviet wcapon systems and related military quip 
ment is not unique. Soviet dependence on Western 
technology was visible and clear-cut in the yean 
immediately after World War 11, when tbe Soviets 
stole Western nuclear secrets leading to tbcir develop 
ment of a nuclear weapon capability, and copied a US 
bomber in its entirety leading to production of their 
TU-4. To achieve major improvements in tbeir mili- 
tary capability quickly, they exploited captured scjen- 
tists and industrial plants and resorted to a combina- 
tion of espionage, stealing, and copying Western 
systems. 
Since that early period of near-complete reliance in 
the 1 9 5 0 ~  the Soviets' dependence on Western tech- 
nology to devtlop their weapons has decreased. Nev- 
ertheless, despite several decades of Soviet priorities 
focused on science, technology, and weapon systems, 
the Soviets, because of their inability to be innovative 
US Radar Expert Passes Over 20 Significant Clussi- 
fied Reports on Future US Weapon ~yirems to Intel- 
ligence Agent 
William H. Bell, a radar project engineer for a high- 
technology US ddensefirm was recruited by an 
intelligence officer who operated under cover as a vice 
president d t h e  Polish firm caNed Polamco. This 
firm is a subsidiary of the Polish Government Corpo- 
ration and is incorporated in Illinois and Delaware. It 
began as an importer/exporter d machinery, parts 
and tools and as a consultant to firms exporting these 
products to Poland. The recruitmenr began as a 
simpleJriendship between neighbors with mutual 
sporting interests, grew quickly to include theirfam- 
ilies, rhen to proving Bell's credentials by showing a 
classified document to the agent, and then to passing 
microfilm copies of classified reports at meeting 
places in rhe US, Switzerland, and Ausrria. Mr. Bell 
was in financial srraits and was easily iduenced by 
the cash pr0flered-a total dSll0,OOO over a three- 
year period. In all, over 20 highly classified reporls 
on advanredfuture US weapon systems or their 
components were passed to rhe Polish Intelligence 
Service and probably evenrually ro the Soviet Intelli- 
gence Service. 
Among rhe classified reports, those of prime impor- 
tance to the West included: the F-I 5 look-down- 
shoor-down radar system, the quiet radar system for 
the BI and Stealth bombers, an all-weather radar 
system for tanks, an experimental radar system for 
the US Navy, the Phoenix air-to-air missile, a ship 
borne surveillance radar, the Patriot surjace-to-air 
missile, a rowed-array submarine sonar system, a 
new air-to-air missile, the improved HAWK surjace- 
to-air missile, and a NATO air-ddense system. The 
idormation in rhese documents put in jeopardy exist- 
ing weapons and advanced future weapon systems q f  
the United ~ t a t e s  and its Allies. The acquisition d 
mhis idormation will save rhe Polish and Soviet 
Governments hundreds dmillions d dollars in R&D 
dor t s  by permitting them to implement proven de- 
signs developed by the Unired States and by fielding 
operarional counterpart systems in a much shorter 
time period. Sp'ecifications on current and future US 
weapon systems will emble rhem to develop ddensive 
countermeasure systems. 
and effectively apply new technology to weapons 
developments, still depend on Western technology and 
quipment to develop and manufacture some of their 
advanced weapon systems more quickly. 
Today, Soviet military designers carefully choose the 
Western designs, engineering approaches, and q u i p  
ment most appropriate to their deficiencies and needs. 
These needs are still substantial and pervade almost 
every area of weapons technology and related manu- 
facturing quipment. Table 2 lisu classes of Western 
technology acquired by the Soviets and East Ebopc- 
ans and illustrates the wide range of Swiet military 
technology needs. In the following paragraphs of this 
section, Soviet Bloc acquisitions have been grouped 
according to their likely applications: stratepic sys- 
tems, aircraft systems, naval systems, and ~ c t i c a l  
systems. Also cited are acquisitions in the microelec- 
tronic and computer areas that have broad application 
to military and industrial programs. In certain of 
these areas, notably the development of microeltc- 
tronics, the Soviets would have '=n incapable of 
achieving their present technicai level without the 
aquisition of Western technology. In other areas, 
aquisitions have allowed the Soviets to reduce the 
indigenous effort they would otherwise have had to 
expend. 
The Soviets' strategic weapons program has benefited 
substantially from the aquisition of Western technol- 
ogy. The striking similarities between the US Minute- 
man silo and.the Soviet SS-13 silo very likely resulted 
from aquisition of US documents and expedited 
deployment of this, the first Soviet solid-propellant 
ICBM. The Soviets' ballistic missile systems in par- 
ticular have, over the riast decade, demonstrated 
qualitative improvements that probably would not 
have been achieved without Western acquisitions of 
ballistic missile guidance and control technology. The 
most striking example of this is the marked improve- 
ment in accuracy of the latest generation of Soviet 
ICBMs-an improvement which, given the level of 
rele~int  Soviet technologies a d h d e  ago, appears 
almost .ceflahly to have been speeded by the acquisi- 
tion of Western technology. Their improved accuracy 
has been achieved through the exploitation and devel- 
opment of good-quality guidanct components-uch 
Selected Soviet and East European Legal and Illegal Acquisitions 
From the West Affecting Key Areas of Soviet Military Technology 
Key Technology A m  Notable Success 
Computm Purchases and aquuitions of complete syslem designs. concepts, hardware and software, including a 
wide variety of Western general purpose computers and minicomputm. for military applicatiom. 
Microclcctronia Complete industrial proccsra and semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabk of d n g  all 
Soviet military requirements, if aquisitions were combined. 
Signal Pracssing Aquisitions of prowsing quipment and know-how. 
Manufacturing Acquisitions of automated and precision manufacturing quipment for elcnronicr,matamls. a d  oplial 
and future laser weapons technology; aquisition of information on manufacturing technology r e h t d  to 
weapons. ammunition. and aircraft pans including turbine blades, cornputen. and electronic 
components; aquisition of machine tools for cutting large g u n  for ship propulsion systems. 
Communications Aquisitions of low-power, low-noise, high-~mitiYity receivers. 
Lten Acquisitions of optical, pulsed p o w  source, and other laser-related annponenrs, including spc i r l  
optical mirrors and mirror technology suitable for future laser -porn. 
Guidance and Navigation Acquisitions of marine and other navigation ruriven,  advanced intrrirl-guidmcccomponents, including 
miniature and hser  gyros: acquisitions of missile guidancc subs tems;  acquisitions of precision 
machinery for ball b r i n g  production for missile and other applicatioar; acquisition of missile la n n g e  
inunrmcatnlion sys tem and docvmmtation and precirm eimtfnodolina for collecting data critical to 
portflight ballisti; missile analysis. 
Structural Materials Purchases and acuuisitions of Western titanium alloys. welding quipment, and,funvca for producing 
titanium plate of large size applicable to submarine construction. 
Propulsion Missile technology; some ground propulsion !ahnology (diesels, turbim. and muria): purchases and 
squisitions of advanced jet engine fabrication technology and jet engine daipn informalion. 
Acousticll Senson Acquisitions of underwater navigation and diration-finding equipment. 
Eleclrosptical Sensors Acquisition of information on satellite technology, laser m n g c h d m ,  and u n d m r t a  low-light-Id 
television a m e m s  and systems for remote operation. 
R a h n  Acquisitions and exploitations of air defense radars and antenna designs for mki lc  systems. 
as gyroscopes and accelerometers. The quality of 
these instruments, in turn, depends to a considerable 
degree on the quality of the small, precision, high- 
speed bearings used. 
Through the 1950s and into the l96Os, the Soviet 
precision bearing industry lagged significantly behind 
that of the West. However, through legal trade 
puiciiases in the 1970s. tbe Soviet Union acquired US 
precision grinding machines for the produdion of 
small, high-precision bearings. Similar grinding ma- 
chines, having lower production-rate capabilities, - 
were available from several foreign countries. Only a 
few of these machines, either US or foreign, would 
have been sufficient to supply Soviet missile designers 
with all the quality bearings they neded. Thtse 
p u r c h a s ~  provided the Soviets with the capability to 
manufacture precision bearings in large volume soon- 
8 
er than would have be.; likely through indigenous 
devciopment. The Soviets probably could have used 
indigenous grinding machines and produced the re- 
quired quaIity of bearings over a long period by 
having an abnormally high rejection rate. 
While some of the Soviet acquisition in the aircraft 
area appears directed toward the development of 
countermeasures against Western systems, the Soviets 
appear to target data on Western aircraft primarily to 
aquire  the technology. Furthermore, while the Sovi- 
ets have acquired a large amount of hardware and 
data from planes downed or captured in Vietnam and 
elsewhere, they continue to attempt to aquire  the 
most advanced technologies through both legal and 
'illegal transactions with the West. Assimilation of 
Western technology has been of great benefit to both 
their military and commercial aircraft development 
programs-to the extent that aircraft from certain 
Soviet military design bureaus are to a significant 
degree copies of aircraft of Western design. Soviet 
military aircraft designers have "ordered" documents 
on Western aircraft and gotten them within a few 
months, including plans and drawings for the US 
C-5A giant transport aircraft early in its development 
cycle; these plans, although dated now, have contrib 
uted to current Soviet development of a new strategic 
military cargo plane. Designers were in particular 
n d  of data on US technological advances, but more 
importantly, they needed information on aerospace 
manufacturing techniques. 
Soviet aircraft designers have been interested in US 
military transports and wide-body jets and probably 
have managed to accelerate the development pro- 
grams for their IL-76 Candid and IL-86 transports. 
The IL-86 looks much like the Boeing 747 and the 
IL-76 resembles the C-141. Neither system is an 
identical copy. 
The IL-76 also is used by the Soviets as the platform 
for their new AWACS (Airborne Warning And Con- 
trol System), which is expected to be operational in 
the mid-1980s. This system will provide the Soviets 
with a major improvement in attacking low-flying 
missiles and bombers. The Soviet AWACS is striking- 
ly similar in many ways to the US AWACS, and is a 
major improvement over their old AWACS. 
The Soviets' acquisition effort in the naval systems 
area reflects well the two major factors that motivate 
their requirements: the aquisition of technology not 
readily available to them-yet critical to their pro- 
grams-and the acquisition of quipment which, 
while producible in the Soviet Union, allows them to 
divert resources'to more pressing naval programs. The 
Soviets appear to have concentrated their acquisitions 
in areas related to aircraft carriers, deep sea diving 
capabilities, sensor systems for antisubmarine warfare 
and navigation, and ship maintenance facilities. In the 
maintenance a k a ,  two huge floating drydocks pur- 
chased from the West for civilian use by the Soviets 
have beendiverted to military use. Drydocks are 
critical for both routine and fast repair of ships 
damaged in warfare. In 1978, when the Soviets took 
possession of one of the drydocks, they diverted it to 
the Pacific Naval Fieet. The other was sent to the 
Northern Fleet in 1981. 
These drydocks are so large that they can carry 
several naval ships. More importantly, they are the 
only drydock facilities in either of the two major 
Soviet fleet artas--Northern or Pacific--capable of 
servicing the new Kiev-class V/STOL aircraft sarri- 
ers. Soviet advanced submarines carrying balistic 
missiles, Soviet Kiev aircraft camers, and Soviet 
destroyers were among the first ships repair& In these 
drydocks. It is important to note that the drydocks 
themselves are so large that no Soviet shipyard would 
have been capable of accommodating their construc- 
tion without major facility modifications, associated 
capital expenditures, and interruptions in present 
weapons programs. n c i r  importance will be even 
more pronounced when the Soviets construct the still- 
larger &rriers (for high-performance aircraft) project- 
cd for the 1990s. The Soviets even have acquired 
Western aircraft carrier ca@pult equipment and doc- 
umentation for this larger carrier; catapult technol- 
ogy, though relatively common in the West, is outside 
the Soviet experience. 
Within the past few years, the USSR also has son- 
tracted for or purchased foreign-built oceanographic 
survey ships quipped with some of the most modern 
Western-manufactured quipment. In  place of US 
quipment that was embargoed, other Western equip 
ment has been installed on the ships. This moderniza- 
tion of what is the world's largest oceanographic fleet 
with Western technology will help support the devel- 
opment of Soviet weapon system programs and anti- 
submarine systems against the West. 
Although the Soviets have a strong indigenous tech- 
nology base that could suppsrt the development of 
much of their tactical weapons systems, this does not 
pregint them from maintaining an ambitious program 
for acquiring and benefiting from Western technology 
in this area. In some cases, their acquisitions satisfy 
deficiencies in  Soviet technology; smart weapons tech- 
nology and electro-optical technology are examples of 
Table 3 
Microelectronic Equipment and Technology 
Legally and Illegally Acquired by tbe Soviet Bloc 
Equipment or Technology Comments 
Procas Technology for . The Soviets haw acquired hundreds of specific picas of quipment related to wafer preparation, 
Mirroclcnronic Wafer including expitaxial growth furnaces. crystal pullen, r i m / d r y m  slicers. and iapping and polishing 
Preparation units. 
R o w  Technoiogy for Many acquisitions in this area include computer-aided design toftware, pttcrn generators and 
Producing Circuit Marks compitcrr, digital plotters, photorrpcaim, contact printers, mask comparators, elcclron-beam gener- , 
atom. and ion millinn muiament. 
Equipment for Device Many hundreds ofacquisitions in this area have provided the W c t r  with mask alignm, diffusion fur- 
Fabrimtion nacu, ion implanters, toam, etchm, m d  photocbmical pmccs lines. 
Assembly and T a t  Equipment Hundreds of items of Western equipment, including scriben, bonden, ptok t m ,  md final t a t  
equipment have b a n  aequircd by the Soviets. 
this. Signal and information-processing technology, 
particularly for Soviet air defense systems, is another. 
More often, however, technology is exploited to speed 
up a developmental program or to improve upon 
original Western designs in an expeditious manner. 
The Soviets appear to have concentrated their tactical 
systems aquisitions on Western tank, antitank, and 
air defense-related technology and equipment in or- 
der to derive concepts and know-how to benefit their 
weapons programs and to design countermeasures to 
the Western systems. The Soviet SA-7 heat-seeking, 
shoulder-fired antiaircraft missile contains many fea- 
tures of the US Redeye missile. Such aquisitions 
have enabled the Soviets to obtain advanced tactical 
weapon capabilities sooner than otherwise would have 
been possible. 
Western equipment and technology have played a 
very important, if not crucial, role in the advancement 
of Soviet microelectronic production capabilities. This 
advancement comes as a result of over 10 years of 
successful acquisitions-through illegal, including 
clandestine, means--4 hugdreds of pieces of We.tern 
rnicroekctronic qujpment worth hundreds of millions 
of pollars to equip their military-related manufactur- 
ing facilities. These aquisitions have permitted the 
SoSiets to systematically build a modern microelec- 
tronics industry which will be the critical basis for 
enhancing the sophistication of future Soviet military 
systems for decades. The acquired quipment and 
know-how, if combined, could meet 100 percent of the 
Soviets' high-quality microelectronic needs for mili- 
tary purposes, or 50 percent of all their microelec- 
tronic netds. 
Table 3 identifies the microelectronic production- 
related equipment that has been aquired by the 
Soviet Bloc. These aquisitions have been grouped 
into areas related to the four steps required to produce 
a microchip: wafer preparation, circuit-mask making, 
device fabrication, and assembly and testing, 
Soviet computer technology has long been limited by 
fabrication and production technology problems and 
by difficulties in software development. Since 1969 
the USSR and East European countries have been 
developing a family of general purpose computers 
known as the Ryad series. These computen; which 
make up virtually the total Soviet and East European 
effort in large general purpose computen, have been 
and will continue to be used in a wide variety of civil 
and military applications. Western technology has 
been important tp development of the Ryad series by 
providing proven design directions both at the system 
and component levels. The architectural designs of the 
Ryad computers, for example. are patterned after Ofleer Rmals 
those of the highly suCCCSsfu1 mass ~ r d u d  IBM 360 ~ ~ ~ h ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~  y ~ ~ ~ i ~ i ~ j ~ ~  saved soviet ~ i l i ~ ~ ~  
and 370 series, computers that are used in a wide Hundreds of Millions of Rubles 
tange of applications and are highly serviceable in the 
field. A .former Soviet inrelligence oflcer revealed that 
idormarion on Wcclern military-relared rechnology 
With lhis the and EurO~eans by fhe Sodel inldljgence serVjces sOYCd the 
eliminatd many of the risks involved in undertaking military indusrry hundreds dmillions the development and production of a new series of rubles. The aquisition d Western technology oper- general purpose computers, and saved considerable ationally was assigned she highest priorityfor collec- 
amounts of manpower and lime. Since the early 1970s lion by local rerideIICies in luy Wen Euromn 
the Sovieu and Eu-ns have legally pur- countries because d r h e  relarively easy a c m  to 
lhan 390W minimmputen' 'Ome much US and Wesrern rechnology in Europe and ihe which art now being used in military-related organi- praise being received by the servicesfor their aquisi- 
zations. Furthermore, they a n  also developing mini- 
mmputen that are direct copies of Western models. tion d o n s .  
and bn E u r ~ n  mmPuter These acquisiiions were directed by the jlirary 
sfltcms has kn aided mennr--fegal ma&acluring j,,duslrjes the Council dMj, , js-  
and illegal, including clandestine-for acquiring the 
needed ttchnical know-bow. 
rers, and there was intense competirio~ herwcrn rhe 
intelligence services to q u i r e  Warern lerhnolopy 
needed for wapotu dcvelopmcnt programs. Ojpar- 
Thus, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allia have ricvlar Ned by weawm been lhe 
derived significant military gains from their aquisi- acquisition knowledge on special mlo- tions of Western technology, particularly in the stra- bly the weaving dcarbonfilamenrs in a three tegic, aircraft, naval. t a c t i d ,  mi==l=mni=, and dimeNionol CortligrrrariOn the sewices were computer areas. This multifaceted Soviet aquisitions lasled to The endproducrJJrom 3-D program has allowed the Soviets to: carbon-carbon weaving technology are ustful for ab- 
Save hundreds of millions of dollars in RBD costs, blive hear shields for high rlociry reentry rhiclrr 
and years in R&D development lead time (set inset). (rhe warhead part d ICBMs and S U M S )  and for 
Mdcrnize critical sectors of their military industry poniom drockel moror5~or large missilUU 
and reduce enginefine Or copy- The Soviet aqujsirjon dsome drh j s  is 
jng mn thereby limiting the likely ro enable them to ewntually gain a capability rise in their military production cotu. /or increased military options against the West-+ 
Achieve greater weapons performance than if they capability that orherwise would haw taken them 
had to rely solely on their own'technology. several addirional years to develop themselves. The 
lncomrrate counarmeasures wcams inrelligence services also worked closely wirh sciem early in the development.of their own weapon ris~sfrom the Soviet military mandacturing indus- 
programs. tries and even planned joint operarions against West- 
These gains are evident in all areas of military ern Trade and Equipment Fairs in order to acquire 
weapons system. While difficult to quantify, it is rechnoloD, clear that the ~ e s t e r n  military expenditures netded 
to overcome or defend against the military capabilities 
derived by the acquisition of Western technology far 
outweigh the West's earnings from the legal sales to 
the Soviets of its quipment and technology. 
Outlook for the 1980s 
The Soviets' military R&D and weapon test-and- 
evaluation efforts are continuing at a rapid pace. 
Several hundred development projects for weapons 
systems and major system elements are now under 
way, and it is expected that through the 1980s the 
number of new or modified advanced Soviet weapon 
systems emerging from these projects into production 
and deployment will remain at the high levels of the 
last two dwdes-sorne  200 weapon systems per 
d w d e .  
Soviet military manufacturing capacity increased by a 
significant 80 percent during the 19605 and 1970s, 
and new plant expansion now under way at one-fourth 
of their key weapons manufacturing facilities will add 
considerably to their capabilities. These new facilities 
will be ready to produce weapons in the next four to 
10 years. Plant expansion is in the following areas: 
ground warfare vehicles, including new tanks; avi- . 
ation, including facilities for a ncw B-1-type bomber 
and a new long-range military transport aircraft 
having strategic airlift capabilities; naval shipbuild- 
ing, including submarines for ballistic missiles and 
cruise missiles, as well as full-size aircraft carriers for 
high-performance aircraft capable of competing with 
the United Stata in global operations; and electronic 
and microelectronic manufacturing facilities through- 
out the USSR. The development and production of 
new Soviet weapons at these facilities is sure to be 
more complex and costly than during the 1970s. 
All of this military development and plant expansion 
activity, however, is taking place at a time when the 
Soviet economy has reached its lowest level of growth 
since World War 11. Soviet arinual GNP growth may 
well be limited to an average of 1 to 2 percent by the 
mid-1980s. Stagnation in industrial sectors that are 
key to both the civilian and the military sectors wiIl 
make it increasingly difficult for tbe Soviets to satisfy 
theeneeds of.both. Thus, Soviet leaders will have to 
make tough choices among defeqse, jnvestment, and 
consumption; the competition among rival claimants 
for rtsourccs will become intense. Under these condi- 
tions, it may be impossible for the Soviets to maintain 
curknt growth in military production without hurting 
the civilian economy. 
Despite these economic difficulties, there are no s:3h5 
that the Soviets are shifting resources away from t ne 
military sector or slowing down development of w w p -  
on systems that will be entering the production ste e 
by middecade. New generations of Warsaw Pact 4 
weapons will require selected critical component a114 
modern manufacturing technologies. It k in these 
artas that Soviet illegal acquisitions of Western tecn- 
nology, complemented by legal acquisitions, are more 
likely to be concentrated over the next five to 10 
Among the more important tcchnologies arc micra 
electronics, computers, and signal processing. Micro 
electronics will play a vtry significant role in advanc 
in computers and signal promsing, and all of thew 
technologies will be important in developing advanc c 
Soviet missile, aircrafr, naval, and tactical weapon 
systems, and associated detection systems. Additiond 
projected Soviet technological netds related to sucf 
systems art presented in the append= 
As the m l t  of both tactical and strategic force 
modernizations, Soviet and Warsaw Pact military 
manufacturen are inmasingly pressed by large-scab 
production requirements and the d a t e d  n a d  to 
control manufacturing and materials costs. Thus, 
particularly critical for the 1980s are Soviet .needs t o  
improve their manufacturing capability. To a large 
cxtcnt, the level of manufacturing technology in Sovi 
et plants determines the Soviets' capability to move 
new technology from R&D into military app1icatio:r. 
Manufacturing technologies play a significant role n 
only in tbe development of advanced component tech 
nologies, such as microel~ctronics and computers, b 3  
also in tbt actual production of modern military 
systems. 
Futurc Soviet and Warsaw Pact acquisition efforts- 
including acquisitions by their intelligence services- 
are likely to concentrate on the sources of such 
component and manufacturing technologies, 
including 
Defense contractors in the United States, Western 
Europe, and Japan wbo are the repositories of 
military development and manufacturing 
technologies. 
General producers of military-related auxiliary 
manufacturing equipment in the United States, 
Western Europe, and Japan. 
Small and medium-size firms and research ceniers 
that develop advanced component technology and 
designs, including advanced civil technologies with 
future military applications. 
The combination of pan Soviet acquisition practices 
and projected Soviet military needs indicates that the 
United States and its Allies are likely to experience 
serious counterintelligence and related industrial se- 
curity and export control problems over the next five 
to 10 y e n .  
The task of stopping Soviet Bloc intelligence oper- 
ations aimed a t  Western military and industrial tech- 
nologies already poses a formidable counterintelli- 
gence problem, both in the United States and abroad. 
But that task is likely to become even more difficult in 
the future as several trends identified in the 1970s 
continue into the 1980s: 
First, since the early 1970s. the Soviets and their 
surrogates among the East Europeans have been 
increasingly using their national intelligence ser- 
vices to aqu i r e  Western civilian technologies-for 
example, automobile, energy, chemicals, and even 
consumer electronics. 
Second, since the mid-1970s. Soviet and East Euro- 
pean intelligence services have been emphasizing 
the collection of manufacturing-related technology, 
in addition to wsapons technology. 
Third, since the late 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  there has been increased 
emphasis by these intelligcnce services on the acqui- 
sition of new Western technologies emerging from 
universities and research centers. 
Tbe combined effect of these trends is a heavy focus 
by Soviet Bloc intelligence on the commercial sectors 
in the West--sectors that are not normally protected 
from hostile intelligence services. In addition, the 
security provided-by commercial firms is no match for 
the human penetration operations of such foreign 
inttlligence services. But the most alarming aspect of 
this commercial focus by Soviet Bloc intelligence 
services is that as a result of these operations. the 
Soviets have gained, and continue to gain. access to 
those advanced technologies that are likely to k u s 4  
by the West in its own future weapons systems. 
The Soviet intelligence effort against Western defense 
contractor firms poses a serious problem in itself. 
With more than 11,000 such firms in the United 
Slates and hundreds of subsidiaries abroad, US mun- 
terintelligena efforts are stretched thin. Pro:mion of 
US firms abroad from hostile intelligence threats is 
the responsibility of host governments, but they too 
are feeling the burden of well-orchestrated Soviet 
Bloc efforts. The Soviet intelligence threat and the 
illegal trade problem appear to be severe in Japan. It 
appears that Western industrial security-both de- 
fense and commercial-will bt severely tested by the 
Soviet intelligence smicts and their surrogates 
among the East European intelligence services during 
the 1980s. 
Western industrial nations also can expect increased 
Soviet Bloc intelligence activities directed ax the 
aquisition of their key industrial technologies. Wcst- 
ern export controls arc presently Being updated and 
broadened; the CoCom allies have recently agreed to 
strengthen controls and to enhance their enforcement. 
Moreover, serious hard currency shortages, along with 
generally increased restrictions on Soviet S&T visitors 
to the United States, will make the Soviets men more 
dependent on intelligence and other illegal efforts to 
aquire  the goods and equipment they will need. 
The massive, well-planhed, and well-coordinated So- 
viet program to aquire  Western technology through 
combined legal and illegal m a n s  poses a serious and 
growing threat to the mutual security interests of the 
United States and its Allies. In response, the West 
will need to organize more effectively than it has in 
the past to protect its military, industrial, commercial, 
and scientific.cornnunities. 
Appendix 
Projected Soviet Technological 
Needs and Acquisition Targets 
Through the 1980s 
Given the dynamic nature of their collection program, 
it is expected that the Soviets will continue their 
attempts to acquire a broad range of Western technol- 
ogies. Certain areas, however, represent priority col- 
lection targets for them; these areas are critical to the 
Soviets' enhancement of their weapons capability. 
Over the past decade, the Soviets' most pronounced 
improvements in strategic weaponry have been in the 
development of a MIRV ballistic missile capability 
and a significant improvement in the accuracy of. their 
ICBMs. The former capability was made possible 
largely through the introduction of onboard digital 
computers and the latter through tbe improvement in, 
the quality of the missile guidance systtms and the 
procedures used to calibrate them. Technology aqu i -  
sitions from the West contributed significantly to 
these improved capabilities. 
The Soviets probably will continue to make their 
highest priority the aquisition of Western microelec- 
tronics and computer technology for in-flight guid- 
ance computers. This aquisition effort will be moti- 
vated by a desire to overcome reliability problems and 
also to provide the on-board processing capability 
required for the development of new guidance options 
with the potential for extremely high accuracies. 
The Soviets will also give top priority to acquiring 
information on the latest generation of US-inertial 
components upon which the MX ICBM and the 
Trident SLBM guidance systems are based. Despite 
the past accuracy improvements of Soviet ICBMs, 
these two US systems incorporate technologies be- 
yond -present Soviet technological capabilities. More- 
over, their SLBM accuracies are significantiy behind 
those of US systems. In addition to information 06 
hardware, the Soviets are expected to seek calibration 
sofiware algorithms which, as the guidance instru- 
ment.4 themselves reach their practical performance 
limit, would allow for continued improvement in 
weapon system accuracy. 
Western solid rocket propulsion technology also will 
be a high-priority Soviet acquisition target in the 
1980s. While the Soviets have vast expcrienc. with 
the liquid-propellant systems which represent the bulk 
of their ballistic missile force, they are shifting their 
emphasis to solid propulsion systerns, which have 
practical advantages over liquid systems in a variety 
of applications. At the zame time, the Soviets have 
had only limited success with the progress of their 
solid-propulsion program. They probably will pursue 
the aquisition of information on solid-propellant pro- 
duction procedures, and propellant grain design, mo- 
tor case, and rocket nozzle technolog~s. ' . 
The Soviets' ABM R&D effort has axhued apace 
since the 1960s. As a result, they have gained consid- 
erable expertise in the development of large fixed-site 
radars for early warning, tracking, and engagement, 
and their interceptor technology has also improved 
substantially over the years. Areas m a i n ,  however, 
in which the Soviets will still seek and would benefit 
from sophisticated Western ABM technology. These 
include signal processing for detection, discrimina- 
tion, target assignment, and sensor technology, par- 
ticularly in the long-wave infrared portion of the 
electromagnetic spectrum applicable toward improv- 
ing their launch detection capability. 
Priority Soviet targets in the aircraft area will include 
Western materials technology, particularly composite 
materials to allow weight-efficient designs. The Sovi- 
ets would also benefit from the acquisition of certain 
engine technologies, in particular those critical to the 
development of nigh-bypass turbofans for large strate- 
gic airlift type of aircraft. While, in general, Soviet 
avionics technology appear adequate, the Soviets have 
yet to demonstrate a capability to deploy reliable, 
accurate airborne inertial navigation systems for long- 
range navigation and weapons delivery. Thus, while 
long used in the West, these systems are still prime 
candidates for aquisition. 
Very high priority probably will bc given to the 
aquisition of computer-aided aircraft design technol- 
, ogy, an area in which the Soviets are clearly im- . 
pressed by US progress. In general, they also will 
continue to benefit from the aquisition of efficient 
aircraft production technology from the West to 
r cdua  costs. 
While the Soviets have a strong indigenous air defense 
radar and missile technology, their general lag in 
microelectronics and microprocessing will direct them 
to attempt whmver possible in the West the aquisi- 
tion of advanced signal-processing hardware and 
software. 
The Soviets will continue to emphasize the aquisition 
of naval-related technologies applicable to improving 
their antisubmarine warfare capabilities, an area in 
wbich much Western technology is superior to theirs. 
Thus, a significant effort to acquire acoustic sensor 
technology can be expected, in particular that tech- 
nology applicable to the development of large towed 
acoustic arrays that would assist the localization of 
Western submarines in open waters. They probably 
will also target the aquisition of Western signal- , 
processing hardware and software rquired to fully 
exploit the detection capabilities of these sensors. 
Another critical problem area to which the Soviets 
will direct aquisition is that of submarine quieting. 
Here also the Soviets lag the West significantly. As a 
result, not only arc their submarines more vulnerable 
to detection, but the self-generated noise reduces the 
efftctiveniss of their own acoustic sensors. 
An area in which the Soviets have historically lagged 
behind the West is precision submarine navigation- 
in particular, in the development of submarine inertial 
navigation systems. The need for improvements here 
will bccome more pressing as the Soviets develop long- 
range cruise missiles for land attack which require 
precise knowledge of launch location. 
Tbe Soviets also will continue to target technologies 
related to the design and construction of large aircraft 
carriers (for high+crformancc aircraft) to reduce the 
likelihood& poor design choices that would arise in 
what is for them an entirely new type of construction 
program. 
Much of the Soviet aquisition effort in the area of 
tactical weapons is likely to bt targeted against s u k n  
and sensor technology for tactical missiles and prcci- 
sion-guided munitions. Tbe Soviets will apply consid- 
erable effort in particular to aquiring advanced 
Western electro-optical technology including that re- 
lated to antitank weapons. As in other weapons areas, 
the signal proctssing and microclectronia technol- 
ogies supporting tactical weapon systems will also be 
priority aquisition targets. Technical documentation 
on entire weapon systtms, if obtained, will k used to 
develop countermeasures. 
In the micraelectronics area the USSR is now at the 
stage of implementing its LSI (large-scale integration) 
technology to high-volume production. Despite the 
large acquisitions of Western ttchnology and produc- 
tioh"tquipment over the past 10 yean which have 
brought them to the LSI level, additional acquisitions 
from the West are needed for the m m  sophisticated 
weaponsprojtcts of the future. Ever-intnasing medt 
for higher precision Western equipment wiIl uctend at 
least through the 1980s. 
In addition, the Soviets will require considerable 
expansion of their microelectronic material base to 
support continutd expansion of integrated-circuit pro- 
duction. In this regard, the USSR is seeking Western 
help to build two or three poly-silicon plants that will 
more than double current Soviet capacity for military 
applications. Also, with increasing advances in the 
technology, the USSR already will be seeking addi- 
tional Western assistance in key complementary tech- 
nologies such as packaging and printed circuit h a r d  
production. 
The USSR is expected to focus its future acquisitions 
efforts on the emerging techno1ol;iu related to very- 
high-speed integrated circuits (VHSIC) and very- 
large-scale integration (VLSI). It is important to note 
that, while VHSIC is thought of as a military devel- 
opment program, and VLSI as a civilian technology, 
therds little difference between the two as far as 
SO& produ'ction needs are concerned. The same 
materials, production, and test quipment will be used 
to produce both. in both of these ttchnological arcas, 
the USSR has dcveloptd effe~tive means for illegally 
aquiring Western advanced products. 
Prime Soviet collection efforts in computer technology 
through the 1980s are likely to include large-scale 
scientific computers such as the US-built CRAY-1 
Computer. Computers of this class offer significant 
improvements ovq Soviet models in weapons-systems 
design and simulation and in tbe processing of nu- 
merical data for many military applications. Other 
hardware targets will include: very dense random- 
access memory chips; high-capacity disk drives and 
packs; the so-called "superminicomputer" class of 
machines; and the latest in general purpose computer 
. technology. All of the above targets offer opportuni- 
&s for significant performance improvements and 
' represent technologies of substantial Sovia lag. 
In computer software, the Soviets will continue to 
attempt to collect IBM programs and programs of 
other vendors written for these machines because of 
past Soviet decisions related to copying IBM comput- 
ers. The large and growing number of IBM-compati- 
ble computers in the USSR means tbat collection 
activity in this area can be expected to increase. The 
compelling attraction of computer networks also 
should spur great Soviet interest in acquiring net- 
work-control software and other programs related to 
networking. 
How far htis the Soviet lhion gone 
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Soviet es 
1 5 v  Walter Taylor 
~ a s h ~ n ~ t o n  ~ u r e a u  of The Sun 
Washington-As a target for g- 
pionage, William Holden Bell was 
textbook perfect. 
Then 59 years old md trying to 
keer, pace with a w w  wife 25 years 
his jvnior, he was bitter about a rela- 
tively warewarding cmwx d dcs- 
penbely in need of a h  to a 
liitstyle gf travel and leisme. 
In short, Bell, a xyhr 
expert for H y h c s  Anarft m- 
ny, a major U.S. defame -or, 
was ripe for the picking. And wed 
he was. 
Before the FBI m t  op with 
him last summer, Bell, in ff- 
for about $119,000, haied to 
1 P o b h w . 1 C Q g c t . r s i f i e d  m f ~ l l ~ t i m  .ane of ttRe 
West's most closely @laded mqt- 
om Systelns, ilxhdhg the skdth 
to offset the Wamw W s  m- 
cal superiority in EmPp. 
The Bell case is tbe rbdf of spy 
drama in an era in rhich y 
interestsbavecometooutwughtbe 
I First of th~ee  a ? t d e a  - 
political mothawb of earlier 
-. Today. spb..e.~~p~~ll,* 
s!ored m =wQt= 
technology that goes into a child's 
electronic bprhlt game, .ad 
dummy corporatiinm phy 88 great a 
role as do secnt Mta drops Pad 
rnidmght rendezvous. 
More ai9nifirint. tk coc ilhrs- 
t r a z  what law ad- Mi-  
cials in the United ~-~ 
Attorney CmerPl William Frcach 
Smith and FBI I)nator William H. 
Webster-see as a change in tPetia 
by the Soviets in a cancerted effort 
to obtain data about Amuican ad- 
vances in military and indmrtrial 
technology. 
While espionage in the United 
States certainly is mWng new for 
the Soviets, the law enfolrcmeot of- 
ficials see the Kremlin turning more 
than ever to claadestiDe means of 
gaining scientific hardware d 
know-how, since bans on wa-the- 
counter traasfers rere adaed by 
Residents Carter and Rugon. 
President Carter orrkred a par- 
tial ban on techoology sales to Mos- 
cow dter the Ikcember, 1979, Soviet 
iuvasion of AfghanMan. Last month, 
President Reagan s e t  to torrghcn 
the embargo following the military 
crackdown in Poland, which he bas 
said was inspired by the Rremlin. 
The Reagan a ' ' tion's ac- 1 tion, federal l a w s  offi- 
pionage siphons U, 
ckts believe, is likely to spur the 
KGB and the GRU, the two Soviet in- 
~ 8 g e a c i e s o p e r a t m g i n t h i s  
amdry, to ever-greater efforts to 
obtain secretly and illegally what 
LIoreow ance might have Pcqnired 
WY. 
S a w e r p a t s , b o t b y m m e a n s  
all, ke the .cquisition of oattide 
technology as vitnl to Moscow's 
haps of coatianag its military com- 
petitha with the United States and at  
t h e n m c t i m c . d ~ ~ i t s o w n i n -  
tulaalarmanic problem. - I f t b e y w e r e n o t a M e t o u ~ I a t a n ~ -  
lror as a aort of "quick fir," some of these experts m, the ,%vie& would mnfrout a Santiaaing se- 
ties of d i f f i i  trade-offs, paltlcularly in allocat- 
ing prccioPs rtscarcb a d  development nsancg, 
intryingtomeetbothttnirdd~.oddrmcstic 
, l t d s .  
Ibe West "is oirtually wrbsidtnng M e t  mili- 
tary power," ups Dr. Miles CoJticlr, who rmrs the 
W- Mitute for Strateg~c Trade and 
aasioPPlly acmes as a m o l r P l  condtu l t  
onE8st-west trade. 
?bse .re some, including a few members of 
aPlgas, who believe the extent to which the 
Kremlir~ dies on Western technology is greatly ex- 
aggerated by a Reagan administration that tends to 
view most foreign policy questions in East-West 
tams. This w d d  seem to be a minority view, how- 
ever. 
Rqmsmtative Jonathan B. Bingham (D, N.Y.), 
c b i m u n  of t8e House Foreign Affairs sobconrmit- 
bce tbpt uwxxm US. trade poky,  .asatS flatly 
t h t t k R r P m , ~ t i l m b a s ~ t e d t h e  
smhlmem of the problem to the United states, 
p a r t m k l y  the amtributim the west has made to 
tbe Soriets t&rough over-thecormter sllcs of ~DOW- 
how. 
ot)las,indadmgmmtoppollcy-mplrcrsmthe 




W some impact," says William A. Root, director 
of the Office of East-West R a d e  a t  the a t e  De- 
pPrtmcat, but "if you take the line that any trade 
free nrmrcg for military production, that h i -  
a l l y  is a fommla for a totaleuhqp, arid this s 
an idea no& being pmsued under present cbmn- 
&ed liberal credentials. 
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D, Del.) for exam- 
ple, says Western technology, princip~lly from the 
United Stam, has beem of "slgnificaat benefit" to 
tbe Sovie& and their Eastern Bloc allies, aad . . he is 
&t jd of rh.t  he sees as a r a v a i n g  dmKUStra- 
tiancfforttoebbrbeflow. 
"It seems to me the administrption loves can- 
merce more than it hates colmnonm." be says, 
citing a Mmller of large, govermaentopproved 
mles to the Soviets since Mr. Loot office 
marc than a year ago, and a lack of law enforce- 
imzmt -in b a l m  illegal acquisi- of indus-  - 
trial aod technical know-how. 
B S. know-how 
Following the military crackdown in Poland, 
five other influential Democrats, including such lib- 
eral spokesmen as Senaton Gary Xart of Colorado 
Pad Carl Levin of Michigan, both members of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, urged Mr. Rea- 
gan to halt all technology transfers to the Kremlin, 
particularly those that would aid the Kremlin's en- 
=w programs. 
If there are differing views about the consequen- 
c e  of technology transfers to the Soviets, there is 
geoeral agreement on one thng: It continues, de- 
spite publicly expressed concern at both ends of 
Pennsylvania avenue. By and large, the Kremlin is 
able to acquire mPch of what it wants, from the la- 
test in computer chips to radar technology to the 
latest advancements m space-age rc~paruy. 
"Soviet leadas have learned they have access to 
Western techwlogy both t)armgh legal and illegal 
channels," Richard N. Ferle, aspistant secretary of 
ddcllse for international security policy, says of 
the ariomacas of the problem. 
"Under the guise of pmchases for benign, civil- 
ian o b ~ ~ ,  the Soviets have obtained a wide 
rtsge of quipment critical to their military pro- 
gram. Where they have failed to get what they 
want openly, they have resorted to a well-coordi- 
mfe& illegal acquisition program. " 
Speaking on the threat of Soviet espionage last 
maath, Attorney General Smith told a Los Angeles 
group that because the United States relies so high- 
Iy on superior military technology, the current 
casts to national acPrity through such losses are 
"iucalcnable." 
The Bell case, which led last fall to his convic- 
Uan and.that of his Polish confederate, Marian W. 
ZIChMti. 01) arpioeage charges, illustrates the 
kind of sensitive tnilhy information that stimu- 
lates such contacts as the Polish link to Bell: 
The FBI still will not discuss certain details of 
the case, or describe in detail the extent of the na- 
tionnlrecmitybrtpch. 
Evidace and tatirhoay at  Mr. Zachanki's trial, 
however, indicated that auxmg the secrets obtained 
by Polish intellrgeace (and, US. officials assume. 
by the KGB) was information about the Stealth 
bomber project, a new; rapid-firing. radar-con- 
trolled antiaircraft and antitank gun; a sophisticat- 
cd antitank missile, and the socalled "look-down. 
shootdown" radar of America's most sophsticated 
fighter plane. 
The Stealth bomber is the super-secret aircraft 
being dcsigaed to replace the B-52 and the planned 
5 1  bombers as the airborne component of this 
camtry's nuclear triad. The plane is so named be- 
cause of its hoped-for invulnerability to Soviet ra- 
dar detection. 
The other weapons systems are e:emen& of 
NAlWs conventional deterrent forces in Europe. 
aad provide tbe West with technology to counter 
the massive numerical superiority in tanks, planes 
and mldien of the Warsaw Pact nations. 
The "lookdown, sbwtdown" radar, for exam- 
ple, is destgned to permit US. F-15 fighters to 
counter cwmy airuaft that fly low to the ground 
to avoid detection by ground-based surveillance 
systems. 
Soviet radar technology is believed to be much 
Aess advanced than the -can version of "look- 
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Ry Walter Taylor 
Washington Bureau of The Sun 
Washington - In the snmmer of. 
1979, Lawrence J. Brady. then acting 
director of the Carter adminiira- 
tion's Office of Export Administra- 
tion, became an overnight cause 
celebre for critics of &mornic de- 
tente with the %viet Union. 
Mr. Brady, appearing as an ad- 
ministration witness, told a coagres- 
siollpl oversight committee what 
skeptics had bem maintaining all 
along: The Nixan-Ford- policy 
of relatively open trade with the 
Russians w t  only had accomplished 
little toward its goal of moderating 
tee Knmlia's internatiavl daugm, 
Last of a series 
-- 
but in fact was abt t ing efforts to 
achieve them. 
U.S. safewards against the diver- 
sion Of sophist~cated technology of 
potential military use to the Rus- 
sians had only "marginal utility," a- 
serted Mr. Brady. Intemationa1 ef- 
forts by thc West. hr said, were even 
worse. 
His cathartic testimony m y  have 
won him a rrpot in the hearts of con- 
servatives, bat it alsn m u n t  political 
purgatory at  the bands of thc Carter 
White House. Mr. Brady lost his posi- 
ti00 ia tbe cammem Dcportmmt, 
and in January, 1980, a month after 
Soviet troops began rolling into Af- 
ghanistan on trucks manufactrncd at 
a Ural Mcmntain foundry outfit* by 
an American company, be ratgnd 
from the govenmwnt . 
Today Mr. Brady is b c k .  &- 
nt s t q + % r y + r  for 
&de admmstrd Ion e 1s in charge 
of efforts by the R a g a n  White H ~ U K  
to refashion American rad Western 
export policy in a way thnt would de- 
prive the Soviets of the rterdy diet of 
Western technology thcy have en- 
joyed for most of the l a d  -&. 
Unlike rerent govetmmnts, * 
Reagan administration vkrs the, 
control of trade, p a r t i d &  in the 
area of high technology. as  a Strat* ' 
gir weapon that ran deprive the RW 1 
sians of assistanc.0 vitally mcdcd to 
modernize their military-industriel 
ba- 
- .- - 
Techno\oc)., ~ r .  Rrady said in a 
intervie=, "is i h r  one t d .  the , hook ae 'se  had si- Wwld War 
11 , . . that wuld c a m  real 
stra\m in the Sovivt Svstem. 
Along with its eff- to weave a ,V ~ C Y  umt'would em- 
rather than mon' -mercc rithththe 
Soviet BIW. the Reagan a d m l s t r a -  
ti0n has stepped up law cnfomment 
and counterintelligence efforts to re- 
d~ the logs of American b - b o w  
through ilkgal traIISfers and espio- 
mee. 
The US. M o m s  Seroice, traal- 
Lioarlly @!and to prevent material 
from Coming into the country rather 
than leaving it, rcrrntly began a pro- 
gun dubbed "Operation Exodus" de- 
skoed to s c r u ~  morc claeeiy 
cugo boaad far the East. 
T%e FBI and tbe Justice Depart- 
mmt, for their parts, have embarked 
on a mppr  campaign to make the 
public more aware of the espionage 
peril. Actor Efmn Zimbalist, Jr., star 
of the old FBI television series, h a  
been doing looselips-sink-ships spots 
on radio and TV in California, where 
more than 1,000 companies doing 
sensitive work for the U.S. gwern- 
ment are headquartered. 
Concern for the problem is by no 
muas limited to the adminis- 
tration. Servitor SPm N u n  (D, Ca.), 
tbe senior Democrat on the Perma- 
aeat Subcommittee on Investigations, 
has assigned his entire subcommittee 
staff to an invcstigatioa of possible 
kgislPtive s t e ~ z  to cut off the flow of 
information to the Soviets, with an 
eJic towar6 public hearings in April. 
-tor Nunn, in an interview, 
tenncd the transfer of technology "a 
very srriops problem," and openly 
qaestiaacd the ability of the govern- 
ment, as currently organized, to ad- 
dnss it effectively. Without providmg 
specifics, be said a number of legisla- 
tive remedies were possible at  the 
conclusion of his panel's probe. 
So far, autboritles acknowledge, 
the new federal effort on this front 
has fallen far short of stopping the 
flow of illegal diversions to the Soviet 
Union and its Iron Curtain allies, de- 
spite a few spectacular successes. 
Officials of some enforcement 
agencies complain of a lack of funds, 
manpower and, perhaps even more 
crucial to their efforts, the expertise 
necessary wen to recognize tbe so- 
phiktication or potential value of ma- 
terial finding its way to tbe Russians. 
"How does the average customs 
inspector recognize the difference be- 
tween a microchip you can buy at Ra- 
dio Shack and one that tbe Soviets can 
plug into a military computer?'' asks 
om! beleaguered federal official in- 
volved in efforts to stop the flow. 
Moreover, amid the competition of 
commercial, political and bureau- 
cratic interests both inside and out- 
side the government, there is still less 
than total unanimity about the need 
and deslrabilitv of a policy of pre- 
venting trade with the Russians. 
Representative Jonathan B. Bing- 
(D, N.Y.), chairman of the House 
Fmign  Affairs subcommittee that 
U.S. trade policy, contends. 
for e m m P k  that the administration 
kas vastly 'exaggerated the deg'pe to 
which the Russians m n d  on the 
West. 
He described as "utter wrrsense" 
tbe as6ertion that transfers from the 
United States bave played a signifi- 
cant role in Soviet technological ad- 
vancement, and charges that adrnin- 
istration statemeats about tbe seri- 
ousness of the problem "verge on tbe 
hysterical." 
On the academic f m t ,  a number 
of scientists and university adminis- 
trators, citing the cause of intellectu- 
al freedom, have baked a t  Reagan 
administration efforts to restrict ac- 
cess to technology during visits to. 
American campuses. 
Some academicians also have bris- 
tled at  suggestions last 'month by 
Adm. Bobby Inrnan, deputy d imtor  
of the CIA, that American scientists 
should voluntarily submit their work 
for possible government cepsorship in 
cases where it is to be published. 
Some American businessmen also 
complain, though I g s  openly than 
they owe might have. One who has 
w t  tempered  IS outspokenness is 
Robert D. Schmidt, vice c h a i n  of 
Control Data Corporation and an 4- 
vocate of continued economic dett ,te 
with tbe Russians. He complains that 
Reagan poiicy merely serves to spur 
the Kremlin to develop its own tech- 
nical capability, accomplishing little 
of strategic value to the West but 
costing US. companies valuable wer-  
seas markets. 
In general, there is one major area 
of agreement among experts on the 
subject within and outside the govern- 
ment. Given recent history, however, 
this also bodes ominously for U.g ef- 
forts .@-cut the eastward trafflc in 
know-how. 
q t  is worth bearing in mind that in 
the total volume of Western high- 
technology exports to the Soviet 
Union, the United States is a small 
player," notes a recent Rand Corpo- 
ration study, underscoring the point 
b a d e  by others that there is little 
Washington can do unilaterally. 
~.S..experts,  notes Thzne Custaf- 
son, author of the Rand report and an 
expert in the field, amount to only 
about a tenth the level of advanced 
machinery and equipment sent annu- 
TECHNOLOGY . . .  C o n t i n u e L  
- ;~~lWTDiest  Germanv. 
France and Jamn aione. 
"The chart& of g a k R  such s u p  
port from other countries for an ex- 
panded system of export controls are 
small and growing smaller, for 
among the nations conducting high- 
technology trade with the Soviet 
Union one fiads not only NATO a h s  
(whose relucllnce to apply stiffer ex- 
pott controls is of long standing), but 
a h  countries like AasLnlia and 
Switzerland, which are onlikely to 
operate at all." 
A similar wpm? by the cargr& 
si-I Office of Technology A s e ~ -  
ment, which focused specifically on 
the role of Western nations in devel- 
opment nf S-rint Energy mfies, 
reached hke conclusions. 
The lack of support for Resident 
Reagan's trade sanctions against tbe 
Soviets in the ongoing Polish crisb, 
and two years nRn in the wake of the 
Afghanistan Invasion, would seem to 
support such pessimism. 
in its first mapr initiative in this 
area, the Reagan advmistration, fol- &&t events in Poland. lowing up on dwussions bekun The director of East-West tmle at 
amcwp, allled badem last s o m w  at 
the Clttasa rv~nomic summlt. Sought tbe State Department, William A. 
allied support tor pnriwly these Root, .clmaorkdgcd in an interview 
kinds of restr~rlions in early ~anuary. that there continues to be no consen- 
Representatives of COCOM, an Or- sus .mong the allies on preci9ely 
ganization of NATO emtr ies  created w h t  they obould seek to deny tbe 
to control exports to the Communist 
blw. agreed, at Washington's urging. 
to tighten the list of embargoed tech- 
nology, particularlv in the field of I
w-. 
The pipeline issue highlights the 
differing perspectives in tbe West on 
the tcetmology question even after tk 
.a viets. - 
'The concept is not at issue." he 
nid. "It is the questmn of nhat con- 
stitutes aid that remains under de- 
computer know-how, to the Russians. 
Since tbe deliberations of tlre 
group nre'secret, it remains difficult 
to ktermiw bow this agcaaeat  will 
play out ia terms of streagtbcaing 
d e r ;  rcstriaions. Tbe North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization members made 
clear, for example, that tbey plumed 
to go ahead witb sales to 1Yaclcon to 
. i d i a t b e - ~ n o f a M -  
beriannaturalgaspipeltmto~. 
The S,soo--mile pjpcliw, rhicb 
moM supply Soviet gas to W c S t a n  
E m a p e ~ ~ r t r o a g ~ ~ a p p a s e d b g ~  
Rcog~n.dnrinistrptionomtofaffan 
that it rill make comrtries such 8s 
WcstGamuryardFr~acedepemknt 
aa tbe Kremlin, and thus PsEcptible 
to political bloduruil. Mr. Rug.n,  as 
partofBispmgramofPnctioos 
against lrQBcor after tlK military 
crackdown m PolPad, ordered a total 
U S . b a n o a ~ t e d m o 1 0 g y t b l t d d  
aid the Soviets to dewlop t k i r  cmr- 
Some experts question whether 
O M  is any longer a useful vehicle 
for creating barriers to technology 
&s. Ow arch specialist, a bank rep- 
-ti= who asked not to be iden- 
tifii, noted that most of the partici- 
pating Western nations do not even 
include military experts in their 
c o c o M  dekgations. 
"How tbe bell can tbey decide 
rkther amwthg will cantribute to 
the Soviet military if they don't know 
.nytbiag .bout tbe military?" he 
asks. 
*mninatration officials, citing an 
immwe in government rejections of 
proposed U.S. sales to the Soviets 
even Wore tbe Polish crackdown. 
try the United Slates is prepared to 
p it .low if the allies don't cooper- 
ate. 
One smior Pcntrgon official, Un- 
der Secretary of Weme Fred Ikle, 
bas said that if it comes to this. the 
United Strtes might have no choice 
but to try to restrict U.S. tecbnology 
ttlffle!rSeven toallied nations. 
"We h v e  to establish a boundary 
beyond which we will not permit 
sensitive technology to trayel." Mr. 
Ikle told the Reutrrs news, agency 
"We would like to have this boundary 
include not just our allies 'but our 
friends and other coantries that we 
cooperate with." 
But. he warned. Washington would 
stop selling its technology to friend]! 
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CHAPTER VI 
Technology Transfer : 
Definition and Measurement 
Discnssions of tbe economic consequences of trade in technology for both 
the United States and the Communist world have been hampered by conceptual 
and pmctial difficulties in gathering and interpreting data. There is no univer- 
sally accepted defiition of "technology," and in many critical instances, useful 
data ie eimply unavailable. Any attempt to assess the economic importance of 
this trade must therefore inch& a discussion of the nature of technology and 
technology transfer and the ways in which they can be measured. 
DEFINITIONS 
Technology must be differentiated from 
science on one hand and from products on 
the other. Science is the pursuit of knowl- 
edge, whereas technology is the specific ap- 
plication of knowledge to the production of 
goods and services. Science flows freely 
across international boundaries, and even if 
it were possible to effectively control this 
flow, the prospect of doing so raises a t  the 
very least grave Constitutional questions. 
Some control of technology, however, is both 
desirable and necessary in the interests of 
national security because of the military or 
strategic capabilities it may provide. 
The distinction between technology and 
products is more troublesome. If technology 
is broadly defined to mean the knowledge 
necessary to design, create, or implement a 
process; the process itself; or any services 
related to the process, the problem of how to 
treat the resulting product remains. Often 
this will be a "technology intensive" prod- 
uct, one that might be said to "embody" 
technology or from which the technology 
may be extracted through a process known 
as "reverse engineeringw--the deduction of 
the techniques of manufacture from exarni- 
nation of the product itself. Often too tech- 
nology-intensive products have military ap- 
plications that cause them to pose as severe 
a problem to national security as the design 
and manufacturing know-how that went into 
them. 
For commercial purposes, "technology" 
usually refers either to equipment and proc- 
esses that transform raw materials into 
goods and services, to the training that ac- 
company these, or to final products like com- 
puters that embody high technology. But 
there is little agreement, in the United 
States or abroad, as to exactly which prod- 
ucts and process should be included in these 
categories. There are, furthermore, problems 
of measurement within each category. The 
cost of equipment or of the licenses for rights 
to processes, for instance, may not necessari- 
ly reflect the value to the buyer in terms of 
the quality, output, innovativeness, and 
profitability of the final product. The value 
of a purchase, which includes the skills of the 
workplace-the training required to operate 
machines, to achieve practical familiarity 
with the theoretical aspects of equipment, 
and to become able to adapt and extend the 
operation of the equipment-is difficult to 
quantify. Finally, there is disagreement over 
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which products qualify as "high technology 
items. 
To these empirical problems must be 
added the difficulties engendered by the fact 
that a number of both commercial and non- 
commercial vehicles exist through which 
technology of potential economic value is ex- 
ported to the East. Commercial vehicles of 
technology transfer include turnkey fac- 
tories (i.e., a factory built in the recipient 
country by a foreign firm, which is turned 
over to the recipient only when it is ready to 
"turn the key" and start production); licens- 
ing (with and without training programs): 
joint ventures; technical exchanges; training 
in high-technology areas; sale of processing 
equipment; provision of engineering docu- 
mentation and technical data; consulting; 
proposals (documented and undocumented); 
and sale of products that embody technol- 
ogy. Noncommercial vehicles include visits 
in both directions of students, scientists, 
and businessmen or managers; the use of un- 
classified published technical data and 
patents; the reverse engineering of single 
machines or components; and clandestine ac- 
tivities. All of the latter modes of technology 
transfer cost negligible amounts of hard cur- 
rency and, for the most part, have been be- 
yond Government control. Communist 
states have made the most of these tech- 
niques, although they are by no means 
unique in this regard. These channels of 
technology transfer have historically been 
and will continue to be of great importance 
to market and nonmarket nations alike. 
PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT 
COMMERCIAL TRADE IN use trade statistics to measure techn01ogy 
TECHNOLOGY transfers. 
The most common forms of commercial 
technology transfer are the direct sale of 
products embodying high technology and 
various forms of industrial cooperation 
agreements. 
High-Technology Products 
The U.S. Department of Commerce re. 
cently attempted to isolate trade in high 
technology through the examination of err. 
ports in selected categories of the Standard. 
International Trade Classification (SITC). 
This classification scheme summarizes trade 
information for approximatelv 10.000 dif- 
ferent items by or&nizing it into commodity 
groupings. The Commerce study selected 2F 
categories of products which, -it contends, 
contain all those goods that reflect best prac- 
tice in critical technology sectors-machin- 
ery and transport equipment and profes- 
sional, scientific, and controlling instru- 
ments (see table 14). This effort is by far the 
most precise and comprehensive attempt to 
There are problems with the Commerce 
list, however. Aside from quarrels over what 
constitutes a "high technology" good, no list 
based on trade data can be sufficiently de- 
tailed to precisely distinguish between levels 
of technology. This could be accomplished 
only through a caseby-case examination of 
individual exports in light of an accepted set 
of criteria defining "high technology." The 
Commerce Department classifications are 
therefore overly inclusive; they "catch" 
items which do not in fact embody "high" 
technology, if by that is meant state-of-the- 
art or items unobtainable in the East. This 
means that calculations of high-technology 
trade based on these categories are inflated. 
Second, techniques used to value and d e  
scribe exports a t  point of origin in the 
United States cannot reflect the contribu- 
tion of third nations. U.S. technology em- 
bodied in products originating froin Amer- 
ican subsidiaries in Europe or Japan appears 
in the trade statistics of these countries and 
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102 Technology and East-West Trade 
Table 14.-High-Technology Items 
Jet and gas turbines for aircraft 
Nuclear reactors 
Calculating machines (including electronic 
computers) 
Statistical machines (punch card or tape) 
Parts of office machinery (including computer 
parts) 
Machine tools for metal 
Glassworking machinery 
Pumps and centrifuges 
Machine tools for wood, plastic, etc. 
Parts and accessories for machine tools 
Cocks, valves, etc. 
Telecommunications equipment (except TC a radio 
receivers) 
Primary batteries and cells 
Tubes, transistors, photocells, etc. 
Electrical measuring and control instruments 
Electron and proton accelerators 
Electrical machinery, n.e.s. (including 
electromagnets, traffic control equipment, 
signaling apparatus, etc.) 
Aircraft, havier than air 
Aircraft parts 
Warships 




Image projectors (might include holograph 
projectors) 
Measuring and control instruments, n.e.s. 
SOURCE: 0uentific.rion of Western Expons of High Technology ~roducts to 
Communisl Countries. prepared by John Young. Industry and Trade 
Administrat~on. Offlce of East.West Pollcv and Plannlna. US. DeDart. 
ment of Commerce, Prolect No. 0.41 
not in those of the United States. Finally, 
customs valuations are determined by the 
price of the sale. Price does not necessarily 
reflect the full market value of the commodi- 
ty, however; some firms deliberately under- 
price an initial sale in order to break into 
Eastern markets. 
With these reservations, and in the ab- 
sence of alternative superior measures, the 
Commerce system has been used in chapter 
I11 to analyze U.S. and industrialized world 
exports of high-technology products to the 
Communist nations. 
Industrial Cooperation Agreements 
Industrial cooperation agreements have 
become increasingly common in East-West 
trade. In its most general sense, the term 
refers to a broad charter extending wer a 
number of years to conduct commercial rela- 
tions between a Western firm and a centrally 
planned economy. Industrial cooperation in- 
cludes a wide variety of possible relation- 
ships, ranging from the sale of licenses and 
patents to coproduction agreements and 
turnkey plant sales. The comprehensive list 
incorporated into table 15 summarizes the 
basic mechanisms and techniques utilized in 
these ventures. These frequently involve re- 
lationships between trading partners which 
extend beyond simple sales of goods and 
services, to continuous and close contacts 
between trading partners, training, and tech- 
nical assistance programs. I t  can be ex- 
pected that these agreements lead to consid- 
erable communication of technical know-how 
congruent with sales of plant and capital 
equipment. 
Activities in this area are extremely dif- 
ficult to measure. Cooperation agreements 
are often complex and their values particu- 
larly difficult to establish because many 
East-West transactions involve counter- 
trade rather than cash (see chapter 111). 
Chantertrade is particularly attractive to 
Eastern nations with scarce hard-currency 
resources and a need to foster exports to the 
West. But while its importance in Commu- 
nist countries is becoming increasingly ap- 
parent, little data on such agreements exist. 
The US. Department of Commerce esti- 
mates that in Poland, 40 to 50 percent of 
electrical products and machinery exports to 
the West in the 1980's wil l  be part of 
countertrade agreements; and 38 percent of 
Soviet trade turnover between 1976 and 
1980 will be generated through counter- 
trade.' There are no comprehensive studies 
of the full range of countertrade transac- 
tions, although the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) has studied individual categories of 
 contract^.^ 
'See U.S. bpartment of  Commerce, East-West Counter 
tmdP Pmchces. An Intmductory Gurde for Busrness, Indus- 
t ry  and Tmde Administration. August 1978. 
'Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop 
ment. Countemode Pmctices in East-West Economic Reh- 
Zions. Paris. Mar. 23,1978. 
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Tabh 15.-Types of Contnctwl Amngemonts 
Included in Different Definitions of East-West 
Industrial Coopemtion 
1. Sale of equipment for complete production systems, or 
tumkey plant sales (usually including technical assist- 
ance). 
2. Licensing of patents, copyrights, and production know- 
how. 
3. ~ i a n c h i s i n ~  of trademarks and marketing know-how. 
4. Licensing or franchising with provision for market shar- 
ing and quality control. - 
5. Cooperative sourcing: long-term agreement for pur. 
chases and sales between partners, especially in the 
form of exchanges of industrial raw materials and inter- 
mediate products. 
6. Subcontracting: contractual agreement for provision of 
production services, for a short term and on the basis of 
existing capabilities. 
7. Sale of plant, equipment, andlor technology (1-3 above) 
with provision for complete or partial payment in result- 
inp or related products. 
8. production contractings: contractual agreement for pro- 
duction on a continuing basis, to partner specifications, 
of intermediate or final goods to be incorporated into 
the partner's product or to be marketed by him. In con- 
trast to subcontracting, production-contracting usually 
is on the basis of a partially transferred production capa- 
bility, in the form of capital equipment andlor technol- 
ogy (on basis of a license or technical assistance con- 
tract). 
9. Coproduction: mutual agreement to narrow specializb 
tion and exchange components so that each partner 
may produce and market the same end product in his r e  
spective market area. Usually on the basis of some 
shared technology. 
10. Product specialization: mutual agreement to narrow the 
range of end products produced by each partner and 
then to exchange them so that each commands a full 
line in his respective market area. In contrast to coop 
erative sourcing, product specialization involves adiust- 
ment in existing product lines. 
11. Comarketing: agreement to divide market areas for 
some product(s) andlor to assume responsibilities for 
marketing and servicing each other's product(s) in r e  
spective areas. Joint marketing in third markets may be 
included. 
12. Project cooperation: joint tendering for development 
projects in third countries. 
13. Joint research and development: joint planning, and the 
coordinated implementation of RBD programs, with pro- 
vision for joint commercial rights to all product or proc- 
ess technology developed under the agreement. 
14. Any of the above in the framework of a specially formed 
mixed company or joint venture between the partner 
firms (on the basis of joint equity participation, profit 
and risk-sharing, joint management). 
SOURCE: Offlce of Technology Assessment. 
Table 16 summarizes one of the most r e  
cent attempts to classify types of coopera- 
tion agreements by frequency. I t  shows that 
in 1976 coproduction based on the principle 
of specialization accounted for more than 38 
percent of East-West agreements. This kind 
of transaction involves the transfer of an en- 
tire production activity to a new location, 
usually in Eastern Europe. After coproduc- 
tion, the next most common agreements 
were turnkey plant sales and the sale of 
licenses. 
Coproduction.-Under this kind of agree 
ment, each partner specializes either in the 
production of certain parts of a finished 
product, which is then assembled by one or 
both partners; or in the manufacture of a 
limited number of articles in the production 
range, which are exchanged so that each 
partner can offer a full range of products. 
The technology is usually provided by one of 
the partners, but in some cases may be the 
culmination of joint R&D effort, Generally, 
coproduction and speualization agreements 
also include cooperative marketing arrange 
ments. Usually the product bears the trade- 
mark of both partners, each of which has ex- 
clusivity for the market in its own area but 
shares the market in other countries. In c e  
operative agreements with the Soviet Union, 
the Western partner usually has priority for 
selling in the industrialized West, and the 
Soviet Union confines its sales to Warsaw 
Pact nations and possibly certain developing 
countries. 
The attraction of such agreements for 
both the Western and Eastern partners is 
obvious. The Western firm may acquire raw 
materials and/or labor in the East. The 
Eastern country expands its repertoire of 
manufacture, its markets, and often its po- 
tential for earning hard currency. 
Turnkey Plants.-Of all cooperation 
agreements, turnkey transactions are per- 
haps the most effective means of technology 
transfer. Although technology may in m y  
cases be purchased or Ieased through 
straightforward transactions in the market- 
place, turnkey projects afford the possibility 
of acquiring whole production systems- 
from feasibility studies, construction, and 
training through technical assistance during 
the initial run-in period. Further, most trans- 
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Table 16.-Classification of East-West Industrial Cooperation Agremnents 
by Percent 
Sumy of June 1,7976 
Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  Czechoslovakia 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  East Germany 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Hungary 



























Tobl CYEA countries 
1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  100.0 28.2 11.9 
1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  100.0 26.1 21.7 
June 1,1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  100.0 17.1 20.5 
CMEA = Cwncil for Mutuai E m i c  Assistance or Comecorn. 
%wly of license in ac- (in part at least) for products or components 
SOURCE: Ecommic Commission for Europe. United Nations. 
actions guarantee an ongoing relationship 
with the supplier, opening the possibility of 
access to developing technology. The con- 
tinuity of these relationships is universally 
regarded as the most important single ele 
ment affecting the success of a technology 
transfer. 
Turnkey projects in their pure form, in- 
volving purchase of an entire installation 
from one firm or one country, are relatively 
rare-at least in the case of the Soviet Union. 
Most often, a Communist nation contracts 
with many Western firms for particular com- 
ponents of a complex, including marketing 
and subsidiary services. The Soviet Kama 
River truck plant is a good example. Here, 
the U.S.S.R. dealt with Western firms in 
several countries, assembling its own sophis- 
ticated mixture of goods and services to fit 
its own specifications. a 
Licenses and Patents.-The acquisition of 
technology through licenses accelerates in- 
digenous technological progress and en- 
hances potential export capabilities in the 
East. According to one estimate, the pur- 
chase of a license may cause technological 
progress in the affected field to leap by 7 to 8 
.See Marian S. Finer, Howard Gobstein, and George D. 
Holliday, "KamAZ: U.S. Technology Ransfer to the Soviet 
Union," in Hemy R. Nau, ed.. Technology ltansfer and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976). 
Specialization Joint venturing 
coproduction Subcontracting and other 
years, compared to only 3 to 5 years with the 
purchase of know-how and 1 to 2 years for 
coproduction.' Often the acquisition of a li- 
cense creates requirements for other im- 
provements, more imports, further licenses, 
and the promotion of exports. Licenses may 
be miid for in either currency or in products 
thr-ougfi cuuntertrade z&&tm&ts. In 
Eastern Europe, the latter predaminate.6 
Licensing arrangements are varied, rang- 
ing from a straightforward authorization to 
exploit an individual patent to complex 
agreements on industrial cooperation. These 
may provide for the grant of licenses for 
using patents linked with the importation of 
certain capital goods; of licenses to use 
know-how and technical assistance in build-. 
ing turnkey plants or other industrial instal- 
lations; and of licenses to use trademarks. 
I t  is apparent that the diversity of modes 
through which technology is transferred and 
the complex interdependence of activi- 
ties,which are directly or indirectly involved 
in the process, make it extremely difficult to 
accurately measure the value of technology 
that flows to the East in commercial transac- 
4See Jozef Wilczynski, "License in the West-East-West 
Transfer of Technology." Journal of World Trade Law, 
March-April 1977. 
'The US. Perspective on Enst- West Zndus trial Coopem 
60% International Development Centre of Indiana Universi. 
ty (Blwmington, Ind., 1975). 
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tions. No extensive statistical analysis of the 
transfer function in this respect has been 
made, and available data can support only 
crude analyses of overall volumes and 
trends. Any comprehensive assessment of 
the economic importance of these transac- 




Open and regular contacts between the 
scientific and engineering communities of 
the United States and the Soviet Union have 
received official encouragement through a 
number of bilateral agreements. In July 
1959, a formal agreement was concluded b e  
tween the U.S. National Academy of Sci- 
ences (NAS) and the Academy of Sciences in 
the U.S.S.R.; in the same year the Interna- 
tional Research and Exchanges Board 
(I REX) began a program that sent American 
graduate students and young instructors to 
the U.S.S.R. In 1972, the U.S.1U.S.S.R. 
Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of 
Science and Technology (S&T) was com- 
pleted, instituting bilateral cooperative pro- 
grams in a number of scientific fields. The 
S&T agreement is predicated on the idea of 
building and maintaining a world scientific 
community through open channels of com- 
munication. More recently, exchanges with 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) have 
begun- 
The role that such contacts have in trans- 
ferring American technology with potential 
commercial value is the subject of consider- 
able disagreement. 
Two recent studies of the S&T agreements 
and the exchanges program by NAS have at- 
tempted to assess the value to both sides of 
the information exchanged in these pro- 
g r a m ~ . ~  Both concluded that exchanges with 
BNational Academy of  Sciences, Review of  the 
U.S./U.S.S.R. Agreement on Coopemtion in the Fields of  Sci- 
ence and Technology, National Research Council, May 1977, 
and Review of U.S./U.S.S.R. Zntemcademy Exchanges and 
Relations, National Research Council, September 1977. 
the Soviet Union were worthwhile, although 
their value to U.S. participants may be lim- 
ited by American scientists' lack of familiar- 
ity with the Soviet Union's unique style of 
science and engineering and by the lack of 
Soviet candor regarding weaknesses in many 
areas of its research. Both programs were 
plagued by the rigidity of the Soviet bu- 
reaucracy (although problems with the US. 
bureaucracy seemed to rank a close second) 
and by erratic attendance on the Soviet side. 
In 1978, for example, NAS extended invita- 
tions to 44 Soviet scientists; only 4 partici- 
pated. 
A review of the two studies indicates that 
while the initial contacts provided some 
useful information about Soviet research 
(especially in the fields of medicine, weather 
forecasting, accelerated drug testing, nucle 
ar fusion, magnetohydrodynamics, super- 
conducting magnets, and earthquake predic- 
tion), the primary value of the U.S.1U.S.S.R. 
exchanges to America has been one of edu- 
cating the scientific and engineering commu- 
nity about the nature of the Soviet scientific 
system: 
Not only do U.S. scientists and engineers 
have the opportunity of acquiring at first 
hand new ideas and new perspectives from 
their Soviet colleagues, they also become 
more familiar with the relevant Soviet scien- 
tific literature and are alerted to particular 
Soviet scientists and engineers whose future 
publications likely merit special atten- 
tion. . . . m e  Soviets] have probably r e  
ceived more technical value in computer 
topics, in econometrics, and in management 
science than has the U.S., largely because 
the U.S. is more advanced in these areas. 
But the most significant value to the U.S. 
. . . lies in better U.S. understanding of the 
Soviet planning and management process, 
and of Soviet status and approaches in eco- 
nomics, management science and computer 
science.' It is nevertheless true that the 
United States has, on the whole, taught the 
Soviets more than it has learned from them. 
The NAS expects the future balance to shift 
toward greater equal it^.^ 
'Ibid., Agreement on Coopemtion, pp. 7,43. 
'Ibid.. Zntemcademy Exchanges andRelntions, p. 3.  
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According to NAS. the risk of inadver- 
tently communicating important technology 
through scientific exchange is minimrrl. The 
Commerce Department's Office of Export 
Administration regularly briefs U.S. scien- 
tists on topics they should not discuss in the 
exchange programs. and "except in certain 
narrow and welldelimated fields, problems 
of technology do not loom large. . . The 
Soviets have not managed to translate into 
practice the wealth of American technical 
data already available to them th .ugh  the 
open literature [and as a result] their tech- 
nology is unlikely to benefit greatly from 
any further technical data we might disclose 
except certain specific data which are propri- 
etary or classified. 
A different mstibenefit balance may exist 
in the student exchanges between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. These can 
result in the transfer of technology that is 
difficult to quantify or even identify. Since 
about 1972. Soviet "students." who are 
usually exprienced engineers. scientists, 
and managers of R&D establishments, have 
concentrated on study programs in the 
United States in semiconductor technology. 
'Ibid, inkmcademy Exchanges, p. 4; Agreement on Coop 
amtion, p. 43. 
Photo credit: U.S. &p.rtmenr of Energy 
- R I . g n a o h y d r o c l r u r n i c t u ~ ~ ) t ~  mtvea in th. 6 n * t  union 
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computers, and other fields related to prob- 
lems of applied research. Large numbers of 
Chinese "scholars" are similarly beginning 
to appear in the West. Data reflecting the 
number of such students and the institu- 
tions they attend tell little of the nature and 
amount of the technology they carry back 
with them. I t  has been alleged that this in- 
formation carries potential military signifi- 
cance. As far as can be determined, however, 
no systematic attempt has ever been made 
to quantify its value in either military or 
commercial terms. Any complete assess- 
ment of such exchanges must weigh both 
strategic and potential commercial losses 
against their political and cultural value. 
